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DEVELOPMENTS
The Act of State Doctrine:
Ethiopian Spice v. Kalamazoo Spice
I. INTRODUCTION
From February to September 1974, revolutionary forces in Ethiopia
liquidated the old empire and deposed Emperor Haile Selassie.' The
revolution was the culmination of years of economic hardship, drought,
famine and insurgency.2 It completely altered the economic and political
base of the country. At least one hundred entities were nationalized
under the "Provisional Military Administrative Council Declaration of
Economic Policy" (based on Ethiopian Socialism), which became effective
February 3, 1975.?
Ethiopian Spice Extraction Share Company (ESESCO) was one of
the nationalized companies. After the Ethiopian Government gained con-
trol, Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Company (Kal-Spice), an American cor-
poration and major shareholder of ESESCO, reacted to protect its inter-
ests and minimize its losses by refusing to pay ESESCO for goods sold
and delivered and an account stated. Two law suits followed, filed in the
Federal District Court in Michigan.
The Michigan court invoked the act of state doctrine4 to resolve the
issues presented, and held that the doctrine precluded it from examining
the validity and legality of the Provisional Military Government of So-
cialist Ethiopia's (PMGSE) actions. Therefore, all of Kal-Spice's claims
were dismissed.' The case is currently on appeal in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
II. THE DISTRICT COURT OPINION
The court addressed the issues from the two cases in Ethiopia Spice
Extraction Share Company v. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Company.'
1. Skurnik, Revolution and Change in Ethiopia, 68 Current History 206-07 (1975).
2. The upper middle class, consisting of teachers and other government employees, was
striking for higher wages and greater benefits, while the majority of the population was
suffering from lack of food, water and other basic necessities of life. Id. The insurgency
began in 1962, when Eritrea was made a province of Ethiopia. Statement by E.W. Mulcahy,
Acting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, made before the Subcomm. on International
Political and Military Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs (Mar. 5, 1975), re-
printed in 72 DEP'T ST. BULL. 38B (1975).
3. Ethiopian Spice Extraction Co. v. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co., 543 F. Supp.
1224, 1229 (W.D. Mich. S.D. 1982).
4. "The act of state doctrine in its traditional formulation precluded the courts of this
country from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign
power committed within its own territory." Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398, 401 (1964).
5. ESESCO's motion for summary judgment and PMGSE's motion to dismiss were
granted. 543 F. Supp. at 1233.
6. 543 F. Supp. 1224 (W.D. Mich. S.D. 1982).
1983
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Case one involved claims by ESESCO for goods sold and delivered' to
Kal-Spiceg prior to the expropriation and Kal-Spice's counterclaim alleg-
ing injury from the expropriation.9 Case two involved claims by Kal-Spice
for damages from the PMGSE based on the expropriation of the Kal-
Spice shares of ESESCO stock.10
The Michigan Court heard five motions. In case one, ESESCO moved
for partial summary judgment on the amount owed by Kal-Spice, while
Kal-Spice moved" to have the PMGSE declared an indispensible party
plaintiff, or alternatively, to have PMGSE declared already a party plain-
tiff. In case two, PMGSE moved to dismiss, and Kal-Spice moved to
strike an affidavit filed in support of the motion to dismiss, and to consol-
idate the two cases.1 '
The court began its discussion by addressing ESESCO's motion for
partial summary judgment. ESESCO supported the motion "with an affi-
davit and exhibits consisting of a purchase order dated October 18, 1974,
bills of lading, invoices, and a statement of Kal-Spice to its auditors."'"
The purchase of spice, valued at $1,961,980.4811 was completed prior to
the expropriation. Applying the standards set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(d),15 the court granted partial summary judgment, and set forth an
7. The amended complaint included claims for goods sold and delivered, an account
stated, disregard of separate corporate entitites and "breach of an agreement concerning
oleoresin testing methods." Id. at 1226.
8. Kal-Spice established ESESCO under Ethiopian law in 1966, owned approximately
eighty percent of the ESESCO shares, and contracted with ESESCO to purchase all of the
oleoresin spice produced. Id.
9. Specifically, Kal-Spice claimed: 1) expropriation of all of its shares; 2) wrongful dep-
rivation of shareholder rights; 3) output contract violation; and 4) wrongful appropriation
and conspiracy to appropriate trade secrets. Id.
10. "[Tihe complaint in Case Two is essentially the same as the first Count of the
Counterclaim brought against ESESCO in Case One." Id. at n.2.
11. Id. at 1226.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1233.
15. Rule 56 (c) and (d) provide:
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon
The motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the
hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing
affidaviis. The judgment sought shall bc rendered for.wih if t.he pe_dings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion
If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case
or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing on
the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by in-
terrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist
without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in
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Order16 granting ESESCO judgment for the amount claimed.
After summarily dismissing ESESCO's request that Kal-Spice pro-
vide a bond, 17 the court turned to the PMGSE's motion to dismiss. The
PMGSE based its motion on immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act, a lack of minimum contacts sufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction, improper venue and the act of state doctrine. 8 Finding the
act of state doctrine dispositive, the court utilized the remainder of the
opinion to discuss and apply the doctrine.
III. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
The act of state doctrine has traditionally required that courts re-
frain from making determinations that could possibly have a negative im-
pact on U.S. relations with foreign sovereigns. " The doctrine purportedly
first appeared in England as early as 1674,"0 and has been applied in the
United States since the turn of the nineteenth century.2 ' The case of Un-
derhill v. Hernandez,"2 is often credited with containing the classic Amer-
ican statement of the act of state doctrine. The plaintiff Underhill, a U.S.
citizen, brought suit against defendant Hernandez, a Venezuelan general
of the revolutionary government, alleging that he had been illegally de-
good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts
that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the
amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such
further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted
accordingly.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c) & (d) (1963). The result reached by the court in granting the motion
for summary judgment is consistent with Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. The Republic of
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1972), where the Supreme Court refused to apply the act of state doc-
trine to accounts owing prior to the time of the 1960 intervention by the Cuban Government
in the Cuban cigar manufacturing industry.
16. In pertinent part, the Order stated that Kal-Spice received a quantity of spice for
ESESCO, and that the principal amount of $1,961,980.48 was due and owing for such spice,
with interest thereon. 543 F. Supp. at 1233.
17. The court did not feel that there was any real danger of Kal-Spice not paying a
judgment if judgment was rendered in ESESCO's favor. Furthermore, the court noted a lack
of authority in support of such a request. Id. at 1227.
18. Id.
19. The act of state doctrine is not international law, and is not required or restricted
by the U.S. Constitution. It does, however, have constitutional underpinnings.
It arises out of the basic relationships between branches of government in a
system based on the separation of powers. It concerns the competency of dis-
similar institutions to work and implement particular kinds of decisions in the
area of international relations. It expresses the view that the engagement of
the judicial branch in the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of State
may hinder rather than further the country's pursuit of goals both for itself
and for the community of nations as a whole.
J.G. CASTEL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1162 (1976).
20. See Blad v. Banfield, 3 Swanst 604 (1674), reprinted in 36 Eng. Rep. 992.
21. Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 7 Cranch 116 (1812).
22. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
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tained by Hernandez. The Supreme Court acknowledged that Her-
nandez's acts were governmental acts. As such, they were not the proper
subject of adjudication:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit injudgment on the acts of the government of another done within its
own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be
obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers
as between themselves.2 3
After the Underhill decision, the act of state doctrine remained vir-
tually unchanged for approximately fifty years, and was applied by the
Supreme Court in actions concerning acts of state by the Governments of
Costa Rica,24 Mexico,2 5 and the Soviet Union.2 Had the doctrine re-
mained unchanged, resolution of the conflicts in Ethiopia Spice would
have been straightforward and uncomplicated; Kal-Spice would have
been denied recovery. The doctrine has been modified however, making
application of the doctrine to these facts somewhat more difficult.
In Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino,27 the Cuban Government
expropriated the property of a Cuban corporation principally owned by
U.S. residents. To obtain permission to ship its sugar cargo, an American
commodity broker agreed to enter into contracts with the Cuban Govern-
ment identical to those it entered into with the expropriated corpora-
tion.2 When, however, the Cuban Government presented the bill of lad-
ing in New York to collect proceeds for the sugar, the broker refused to
pay. Taking their case to the courts, the Cubans were denied recovery in
23. Id. at 252.
24. American Banana Company v. United Fruit Company, 213 U.S. 347 (1909), was an
antitrust action. The Court disposed of the case stating "[a] conspiracy in this country to do
acts in another jurisdiction does not draw to itself those acts and make them unlawful, if
they are permitted by local law." Id. at 359.
25. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918) and Ricaud v. American Metal
Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918), companion cases, both arose out of acts that occurred during the
1913-15 Mexican civil war. In Oetjen, one of the revolutionary forces seized hides to help
finance the military effort. When the hides arrived in the United States, Oetjen unsuccess-
fully brought suit to regain title. Ricaud involved appropriation of lead bullion. The Court,
denying recovery, concluded that:
American citizen, who was not in or a resident of Mexico at the time it was
seized for military purposes by the legitimate Government of Mexico, does not
affect the rule of law that the act within its own boundaries of one sovereign
State cannot become the subject of reexamination and modification in the
courts of another.
Id. at 310. See also Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468 (1937).
26. In United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1942), the Court dealt with questions
arising from Russian nationalization decrees, and the Lithuanian Agreement, a Soviet Gov-
ernment assignment to the Government to claims owed by American nationals.
27. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
28. Id. at 404.
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both the district court29 and the court of appeals, 0 ostensibly because the
Cuban Government's act violated customary international law.
The expropriation was the Cuban response to a U.S. decision to re-
duce the Cuban sugar quota.3 1 The U.S. State Department described the
Cuban action as "manifestly in violation of those principles of interna-
tional law which have long been accepted by the free countries of the
West. It is in its essence discriminatory, arbitrary and confiscatory."3 2
Recognizing that expropriations "take place for a variety of reasons, polit-
ical and ideological as well as economic," 3 the Supreme Court, in af-
firming the court of appeals, invoked the act of state doctrine and re-
frained from judicial interference. The Court stated that the judicial
branch will not examine the validity of an expropriation "within its own
territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and recognized by
this country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or other unam-
biguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if there is a
taking violating international law."" The Court suggested that expropria-
tions could be controlled by extrajudicial means, such as discontinuing
foreign aid, freezing assets, and allowing the marketplace to react.3 5
Sabbatino is important for two reasons. First, the Court recognized
that a treaty or other agreement could modify the act of state doctrine.
Second, Congress reacted to the Sabbatino holding by passing the Hick-
enlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.1" This
29. 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
30. 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962).
31. One day after Congress passed an amendment to the Sugar Act of 1948 permitting a
presidential proclamation of reduction, President Eisenhower reduced the quota. Determi-
nation of Cuban Sugar Quota, 25 Fed. Reg. 6414 (1960).
32. Dep't of State Note No. 397 to the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations, dated July
16, 1960, relevant part reprinted at 376 U.S. 403 (1964).
33. 376 U.S. at 435.
34. Id. at 428.
35. Id. at 435. Developing countries depend on foreign investments. If companies are
expropriated, the flow of capital into developing countries will naturally cease, making the
actual and long term effect of judicial relief insignificant.
36. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. §2370 (e)(2) (1961) provides:
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United
States shall decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a
determination on the merits giving effect to the principles of international law
in a case in which a claim of title or other right to property is asserted by any
party including a foreign state (or a party claiming through such state) based
upon (or traced through) a confiscation or other taking after January 1, 1959,
by an act of that state in violation of the principles of international law, in-
cluding the principles of compensation and other standards set out in this sub-
section: Provided, that this subparagraph shall not be applicable (1) in any
case in which an act of a foreign state is not contrary to international law or
with respect to a claim of title or other right to property acquired pursuant to
an irrevocable letter of credit of not more that 180 days duration issued in
good faith prior to the time of the confiscation or other taking, or (2) in any
case with respect to which the President determines that application of the act
of state doctrine is required in that particular case by the foreign policy inter-
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amendment, which applies to expropriations that violate international
law, established a presumption that adjudication on the merits will not
embarrass the executive branch in conducting foreign policy. However,
the amendment is limited to cases in which the property has found its
way back into the United States.87
The Supreme Court next addressed the issues surrounding the act of
state doctrine in First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba."
The case involved a $15 million First National City Bank loan, in 1958, to
the Banco Nacional's predecessor in interest. One year later, in 1959, Cas-
tro seized all of First National City's Cuban branches. In retaliation, First
National sold the collateral securing the $15 million loan, and realized a
profit of $1.8 million on the transaction. Banco Nacional sued to recover
the $1.8 million, and First National, by way of setoff and counter-claim,
asserted its right to the $1.8 million based on the expropriated property.
The district court,8 holding that Sabbatino was overruled by the
Hickenlooper Amendment, ruled in favor of First National. 40 The court of
appeals reversed, stating that the congressional action did not govern the
case." The Supreme Court, in a splintered plurality decision, reversed the
court of appeals and permitted judicial examination of the acts of state.
The Court applied the Bernstein exception,4 which permits judicial re-
view of an act of state where the executive branch expressly states that
application of the act of state doctrine would not advance the interests of
foreign policy. Justices Rehnquist, Burger and White stated that although
the judicial and executive branches of the government are and should re-
main separate, where the executive branch states that application of the
ests of the United States and a suggestion to this effect is filed on his behalf in
that case with the court.
37. 543 F. Supp. at 1229.
38. 406 U.S. 759 (1972), reh. den. 409 U.S. 897 (1972).
39. 270 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
40. On a motion for summary judgment, the district court ruled in favor of First Na-
tional on all except "the amounts by which the proceeds of the sale of collateral exceeded
the amount that could properly be applied to the loan by petitioners .... [First National]
then waived any recovery on its counterclaim over and above the amount recoverable by
respondent on its complaint on its merits." 406 U.S. at 761.
41. 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970).
42. In Bernstein v. N.V Nederlandsche-Amerikaanische, 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949), the
court invoked the act of state doctrine and held that it was restrained from reviewing the
official acts of the Nazi government. Subsequent to that decision, the State Department
issued a release condemning the acts of the Nazi party and relieving "American courts from
any restraint upon the exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the acts of
Nazi officials." Letters from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, Department of State, to
Attorneys for the Plaintiff in Civil Action No. 31-555 in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, dated April 13, 1949, pertinent part reprinted at 210
F.2d 376. In view of the Executive policy, the Second Circuit amended and reversed its
earlier mandate at 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954). This exception is commonly referred to as
the Bernstein exception.
43. The Court noted that "juridical acts of state of a foreign power could embarass the
conduct of foreign relations by the political branches of the government. 406 U.S. at 765.
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act of state doctrine would not advance the interests of American foreign
policy:
[ilt would be wholly illogical to insist that such a rule, fashioned be-
cause of fear that adjudication would interfere with the conduct of
foreign relations, be applied in the face of an assurance from that
Branch of the Federal Government that conducts foreign relations
that such a result would not obtain."
Justice Douglas, concurring, felt neither the Bernstein exception nor the
act of state doctrine should be invoked. National City Bank v. Republic
of China"5 provided that "a sovereign's claim may be cut down by a coun-
terclaim or setoff,"' 6 and relief could be permitted on that basis alone.
Justice Powell, also concurring, rejected the application of Sabbatino,
stating the decision "was not compelled by the principles as expressed
therein, '47 and believed that federal courts have an obligation to hear
cases dealing with expropriations, unless so doing would interfere with
delicate foreign relations. The four dissenters felt the Bernstein exception
"was an abdication of the judicial function to the Executive Branch," and
that Sabbatino dictated the opposite result."
8
Another exception to the act of state doctrine, the commercial activ-
ity exception, was applied by the Supreme Court in Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba." After Cuba confiscated the major ci-
gar manufacturing companies, three importers mistakenly paid the Cuban
Government for preconfiscation shipments of cigars. After the former
owners established their right to the sum already paid, Dunhill brought
suit to recover the excess monies paid. In response to Cuba's assertion
that their action was an act of state, the Court stated:
We decline to extend the act of state doctrine to acts committed by
foreign sovereigns in the cause of their purely commercial operations.
Because the act relied on by respondents in this case was an act aris-
ing out of the conduct by Cuba's agents in the operation of cigar busi-
nesses for profit, the act was not an act of state.
Thus, the commercial activity exception provides another way
around judicial noninterference with acts of state. With the historical
function and recent modifications of the act of state doctrine in mind, the
44. Id. at 769-70.
45. 348 U.S. 356 (1954).
46. 406 U.S. at 771.
47. Id. at 774.
48. 543 F. Supp. 1229. First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional De Cuba could be
the type of case that prompted Erwin Griswold of Washington, former U.S. solicitor general
and Dean of Harvard Law School, to say "[t]he Supreme Court has caused its own
overburdened case load by handing down opinions that provide 'no precedent' for the dis-
trict courts . . . ." Winter, Its Own Fault: Critiquing the Supreme Court, 69 A.B.A.J. 424
(1983). With a 3-1-1-4 split, it is difficult, if not impossible, to state the rule of law decided
in First National City Bank.
49. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
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district court began its analysis.
IV. ANALYSIS
The district court stated that "there is no dispute that the action of
the PMGSE in nationalizing shares of ESESCO held by Kal-Spice was an
act of state."5 0 Next, the court summarily disposed of the Dunhill com-
mercial activity exception, and stated that the Bernstein exception was
also inapplicable because there had been no statement by the executive
branch.51
Subsequent to the district court's ruling, the executive branch made
a statement regarding the act of state doctrine in this case. Therefore, the
Bernstein exception may apply to this case. In a November 19, 1982 let-
ter,"2 the Department of State discussed two issues. The Department
stated that where there is a controlling legal standard for compensation,
such as is found in the Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations between
the United States and Ethiopia 3 (Treaty), "we believe that the presump-
tion should be that adjudication would not be inconsistent with foreign
policy interests under the Act of State Doctrine. 5 4 Also, the Department
stated "[i]n general this Department's experience provides little support
for a presumption that adjudication of acts of foreign states in accordance
with relevant principles of international law would embarrass the conduct
of foreign policy."55 The Department of State's letter clearly supports ju-
dicial resolution of this case. The Sixth Circuit's decision should reflect
the Department's view, and the Bernstein exception, if it really does ex-
ist, should be invoked.
The district court devoted the remainder of its opinion to the resolu-
tion of three issues: namely the applicability of the Treaty; the Hick-
enlooper Amendment; and the significance of the location of the taking.
First, it attempted to invoke the Sabbatino modification to the act of
state doctrine, going to the treaty to find "controlling legal principles" to
resolve the dispute. Article VIII, § 2 of the Treaty provided as follows:
Property of nationals and companies of either High Contracting
Party, including interests in property, shall receive the most constant
protection and security within the territories of the other High Con-
50. 543 F. Supp. at 1229.
51. Id.
52. Dep't of State Letter from Davis R. Robinson, Legal Advisor to The Honorable Rex
E. Lee, Solicitor General of the United States, Nov. 19, 1982, reprinted in 83 DEP'T ST.
BULL. No. 2070, at 70 (1983).
53. Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations Between the United States of America
and Ethiopia, Sept. 7, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 2137, T.I.A.S. No. 2864 [hereinafter cited as Treaty].
54. Id.
55. Id. This sentence was a quote taken from a Department of State letter written in
1975 regarding the Dunhill case. See Dep't of State Letter from Monroe Leigh, Legal Advi-
sor to the Solicitor General of the United States, Nov. 26, 1975, reprinted in Alfred Dunhill
of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 706 (1976).
56. 543 F. Supp. at 1229.
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tracting Party. Such property shall not be taken except for a public
purpose, nor shall it be taken without prompt payment and just and
effective compensation. 57 (emphasis added).
Agreeing with the argument put forth by the PMGSE, the court decided
that the terms "prompt," "just" and "effective" are not defined, and
found the terms to be "inherently general, doubtful, and susceptible of a
multiple interpretation."58 Upon this basis, the court held that the Treaty
did not provide controlling legal principles upon which to render a
decision.59
The district court's holding concerning the Treaty faces two
problems. First, the holding contradicts the basic principle in treaty in-
terpretation which states that the ordinary and usual meaning of the
terms are to be applied. 0 Second, the holding is in conflict with the De-
partment of State's letter which indicates that the Treaty sets forth con-
trolling legal standards."1 The Supreme Court has stated that "[a]lthough
not conclusive, the meaning attributed to Treaty provisions by the gov-
ernment agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is enti-
tled to great weight.' 2 Thus, the Sixth Circuit could either reverse the
district court based upon the obvious meaning of the Treaty or in defer-
ence to the Department of State's interpretation of the Treaty words.
The second issue that the court discussed was the applicability of the
Hickenlooper Amendment. 63 Quoting extensively from Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. First National City Bank of New York," the court held that
the amendment only applied to confiscated property that was being mar-
keted in the United States. Because the assets in Ethiopian Spice were in
Ethiopia, not the United States, the court ruled that the Hickenlooper
Amendment did not apply.65
57. Treaty, art. VIII, § 2.
58. 543 F. Supp. at 1230.
59. The court did state that the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States §§ 187-90 defined these terms. Id. However, the court reasoned that "reliance
on that authority as accurately expressing the meaning intended by the government of Ethi-
opia in its Treaty agreement, despite the absence of any reference thereto, would be unwar-
ranted." Id.
60. In United States v. D'Auterive, 10 Howard 607, 622 (1850), the Supreme Court
stated "compacts between governments or nations, like those between individuals, should be
interpreted according to the natural, fair, and received acceptation of the terms in which
they are expressed," and in De Geofrey v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 270 (1889), the Court stated
that "[i]t is a rule, in construing treaties as well as laws, to give sensible meaning to all their
provisions if that be practicable. The interpretation, therefore, . . . which would render a
treaty null and inefficient cannot be admitted ... it ought to be interpreted in such a man-
ner as that it may have its effect, and not prove vain and nugatory." See also Santovincenzo
v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931).
61. See note 52 supra.
62. Kolorat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961).
63. 543 F. Supp. at 1231.
64. 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970). For a discussion of the case at the Supreme Court level,
see notes 38-48 supra and accompanying text.
65. 543 F. Supp. at 1231.
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The third and final issue the district court discussed was another ex-
ception to the act of state doctrine, which involves the location of the
property taken. This exception was discussed in Republic of Iraq v.
First National City Bank, 7 where the Republic of Iraq, by virtue of an
ordinance, claimed funds that were located in a New York bank." Al-
though the promulgation of the Ordinance was an act of state, the court
refused to invoke the doctrine. The court reasoned:
Under the traditional application of the act of state doctrine, the prin-
ciple of judicial refusal of examination applies only to a taking by a
foreign sovereign of property within its own territory; when property
confiscated is within the United States at the time of the attempted
confiscation, our courts will give effect to acts of state only if they are
consistent with the policies and law of the United States. (citations
omitted).69
Attempting to apply this exception, Kal-Spice argued that because the
stock certificates were located in the state of Michigan, the taking was
outside of the country of Ethiopia, and not subject to the act of state
doctrine.
The court quoted the general rule that "the situs of corporate stock
is deemed to be in the state where the corporation has its domicile, which
is ordinarily the state under whose laws the corporation was cre-
ated. .. .,, Because ESESCO was an Ethiopian corporation, the court
held that the "confiscation of the shares of stock was a taking within its
own territory by the PMGSE which is encompassed by the act of state
doctrine." 17 ' Thus, the court could not apply this or any other exception
to the act of state doctrine.
V. CONCLUSION
In Ethiopian Spice, the district court resolved issues involving
amounts due for spices sold and delivered and the expropriation of shares
of stock by applying the act of state doctrine. Under the doctrine, the
court held that it could not make a judicial determination concerning an
act of the PMGSE. The many exceptions to the rule, including the Bern-
stein and Sabbatino exceptions, were deemed inappropriate.
Subsequent to this decision, the Department of State made a state-
ment concerning this case. First, the Department stated that a judicial
abstention would not advance the interests of foreign policy. Next, the
Department said that the U.S.-Ethiopian Treaty provided controlling le-
gal principles to resolve the issues presented. The Sixth Circuit's decision
66. Id.
67. 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied 382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
68. The funds belonged to King Faisal II of Iraq, who was killed in the 1958 revolution.
Faisal's estate administrator and the Republic claimed title to the funds. 353 F.2d at 50.
69. Id. at 51.
70. 543 F. Supp. at 1231-32.
71. Id. at 1232.
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must acknowledge and reflect the Department's view. The plain words of
the Treaty appear to provide an answer to this dispute. Furthermore, the
Bernstein exception, if it is a recognized exception, can be invoked to pro-
vide Kal-Spice relief.
Robert M. Cooper
Humanitarian Intervention:
A Possibility for Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland has been embroiled in conflict throughout this cen-
tury. Due to the most recent eruptions of political and religious conflict in
Northern Ireland, there have been losses of life and property, and erosion
of the civil liberties of a minority group as well. Human rights involve the
most sensitive areas of an individual's relationship to his society and to
his state. Because most governments are reluctant to surrender their
traditional authority over matters affecting their citizens, a valid question
is raised: Which countries and organizations have the right to intervene in
a situation involving human rights violations? A more specific question
may also be asked: How is it possible for states and international organi-
zations to justify their inaction in Northern Ireland and elsewhere after
claiming to embrace the idea that human rights are to be recognized and
enforced, and not merely conferred? Although this paper will examine the
very recent history of the problem in Northern Ireland, the types of
human rights violations being perpetrated, and international treaties and
organizations dealing with these violations, its main focus will be the pos-
sibility of humanitarian intervention.
In 1948 the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (Declaration or Universal Declaration).1 The Declaration
begins: "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights."'
It continues by naming civil and political rights, such as "life, liberty and
security of person,... freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention or exile,.
. . the right to own property [and] freedom of thought, conscience and
religion."8 Also included are economic, social and cultural rights, such as
"the right to work, and the right to a standard of living adequate for
health and well being."4 Although the Universal Declaration has been in
existence for nearly thirty years, it was not until President Carter's ad-
ministration focused upon human rights as an integral component of
American foreign policy that the issue dominated the international arena.
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A(III) art. 1,
U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Declaration].
2. Id. art. 1.
3. Id. art. 23.
4. Id.
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